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DELIBERATION, JUDGEMENT AND THE
NATURE OF EVIDENCE
JON WILLIAMSON∗
Abstract: A normative Bayesian theory of deliberation and judgement
requires a procedure for merging the evidence of a collection of agents. In
order to provide such a procedure, one needs to ask what the evidence is that
grounds Bayesian probabilities. After finding fault with several views on the
nature of evidence (the views that evidence is knowledge; that evidence is
whatever is fully believed; that evidence is observationally set credence; that
evidence is information), it is argued that evidence is whatever is rationally
taken for granted. This view is shown to have consequences for an account
of merging evidence, and it is argued that standard axioms for merging need
to be altered somewhat.
Keywords: Deliberation, Judgement, Evidence, Bayesianism, Merging.
1. DELIBERATION AND JUDGEMENT
Bayesianism provides a natural account of certain questions to do with
judgement and doxastic deliberation:
Individual Deliberation. How strongly should I believe θ?
Individual Judgement. Should I judge θ as true?
Public Deliberation. How strongly should we believe θ?
Public Judgement. Should we judge θ as true?
Let us consider these questions in turn.
Individual Deliberation. Turning first to the question of individual
deliberation, the Bayesian would answer: believe θ to degree PE (θ ), where
PE is your rational belief function, relative to your total evidence E , which
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assigns a degree of belief to each proposition θ that is expressible in your
language. Bayesians agree that to count as rational, your belief function
must be a probability function and must satisfy constraints imposed by
evidence E . (Bayesians disagree about exactly what constraints evidence
imposes, about how belief functions should be updated in the light
of new evidence, and about whether further norms impose constraints
on the belief function, but these disagreements will not be relevant to
the concerns of this paper.) Since PE (θ ) varies only with E and θ , for
individual deliberation to result in a change in strength of belief in θ ,
the evidence base E must change, either through introspection or through
observation or other forms of external interaction.
Individual Judgement. To address the question of individual judgement,
the Bayesian can treat the decision as to whether or not to judge θ to be
true as she would treat any other decision, by invoking the apparatus of
Bayesian decision theory. The Bayesian’s answer to this question would
then be: judge θ as true if the expected utility of judging θ is greater
than that of not judging θ . Bayesian decision theory presumes that an
individual is equipped with a utility function as well as a belief function,
and that decision matrices can be populated with these utilities in order
to evaluate the prospects of alternative choices. For example, a decision
matrix for judging θ might look like:
θ ¬θ
Judge θ 5 −4
Don’t judge θ −1 3
Here the utility of judging θ , should θ be true, is 5, and so on. The
expected utility of judging θ is 5PE (θ ) − 4(1 − PE (θ )), which is greater
than the expected utility of not judging θ , −1PE (θ ) + 3(1 − PE (θ )), just
when PE (θ ) > 7/13. In this example the Bayesian would say, then, that
you should judge θ to be true when your rational belief function relative
to your total evidence ascribes degree of belief greater than 7/13 to θ .
Public Deliberation. The Bayesian can answer the question of public
deliberation – how strongly should we believe θ? – by suggesting that
we merge our evidence bases E1, . . . , En to yield an evidence base E
representing the evidence of the group, treat the group as an agent in its
own right, and believe θ to degree PE (θ ) where PE is the group’s rational
belief function relative to E .
Note that the Bayesian would say that if we as individuals act together
as a group, i.e. with a common interest, then we as a group ought to
adopt a single rational belief function, sometimes called our intersubjective
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probability (Gillies 1991).1 If the evidence base of the group or the interest
of the group differs from those of its individual members then the
group can adopt a rational belief function that differs from each of the
individual rational belief functions, though of course the act of merging
our individual evidence bases may spur us to revise those individual
evidence bases, leading to an iterative process of merger and reflection
under which convergence between individual and group beliefs may
occur.
Why not merge our rational belief functions directly, instead of
merging the evidence bases which constrain them? This is for three
reasons.
First, our individual belief functions may contain subjective elements
that are irrelevant to group deliberation; merging our evidence, rather
than our belief functions, helps to filter out these subjective contingencies.
Now, different varieties of Bayesianism disagree as to the pervasiveness
of subjectivity. The subjective Bayesian account is very permissive: for
instance it deems me to be perfectly rational if I strongly believe that a
particular football team will win its next match in the total absence of any
evidence either way – all that is important is that my beliefs be consistent
with the evidence that I have. On the other hand, the objective Bayesian
account would insist that I be much more equivocal in such a situation,
giving probability 12 or thereabouts to the proposition that the team will
win its next match, in the total absence of relevant evidence (assuming
measures in place to break a draw in the match). Nevertheless, even
on the objectivist account, PE is not always uniquely determined by E
(Williamson 2010). Thus all varieties of Bayesianism agree that some room
is left for arbitrariness with respect to the choice of belief function. If
individual prior belief functions were directly merged, their arbitrary
aspects would be inherited to some extent by the group belief function.
This would leave a curious position in which only one belief function
– the merger of the individual belief functions – is deemed rational as
a group prior belief function, but where that belief function may be
more opinionated than the evidence demands. For instance, if, under a
subjectivist account, we all strongly believe that Forest Green Rovers will
win its next match, through nothing short of blind optimism – i.e. in the
absence of evidence – , then our merged belief function will presumably
inherit this strong belief. Although individually we would have been
equally rational had we each believed that Rovers will lose, if the group’s
rational belief function is the merger of the individual functions then the
group is rationally compelled to believe that Rovers will win. By merging
our evidence bases rather than our belief functions, on the other hand,
1 There is no need to assume a common prior probability function or common knowledge
here (Aumann 1976), merely a common interest.
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the group will be given precisely the same leeway for subjective choice as
the individuals which compose it: since we have no evidence regarding
Rovers, neither will the group, and the individuals and the group will be
judged by the same standards – permissive standards on the subjectivist
account, but much less so on the objectivist account.
The second reason for merging at the level of evidence rather than
belief is that important information in the evidence can be lost if merging
takes place at the level of belief. One individual’s degree of belief in θ
may be based on little or no evidence, while another’s may be based on
strong evidence. If merging were to take place at the level of belief, i.e. if
the merged belief function were determined solely by the individual belief
functions, then both individuals would typically be given given the same
weight in determining the extent to which the group believes θ , since the
evidence is not taken into account. But then the influence of the stronger
evidence is watered down by giving undue weight to groundless beliefs.
The third reason for not directly merging belief functions is that
there appears to be no such merging operator that is entirely satisfactory.
Suppose one wanted to merge individuals’ belief functions and utility
functions and use the merged functions for group decision making. Then
one would presumably want to impose at least the following conditions
on the belief and utility merging operators. (i) Pareto optimality: if the
group chooses an option, there should be no alternative option that
offers higher expected utility for all individuals. (ii) Unanimity: if each
individual has the same belief function then this function is the group’s
belief function. (iii) Non-dictatorship: there should be no individual such
that the group’s belief function is always set to that individual’s belief
function. As Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) show, there are no belief and
utility merging operators that satisfy the conditions (i)–(iii).
Public Judgement. Finally, let us consider the question of whether we
should judge θ as true. As in the individual case, the Bayesian can apply
the machinery of decision theory here. First, aggregate the utilities that
populate the individuals’ decision matrices for θ (see e.g. Hild et al. 2008).
As in the case of individual judgement, θ should be judged true just if the
expected utility of so doing exceeds the expected utility of not so doing,
except here the expectation is determined by the group’s rational belief
function PE , where E is the merger of the individuals’ evidence bases.
The question again arises: why not aggregate the individuals’
judgements directly, rather than proceed indirectly by merging the
individuals’ evidence bases and then deriving group judgements via
decision theory? There are three principal reasons – reasons that are
analogous to the three reasons outlined above for not merging belief
functions. First, individual judgements may be attributable to subjective
elements, and merging at the level of evidence prevents this arbitrariness
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from propagating to the group judgements. Second, merging at the level
of judgement may pass over valuable information encapsulated in the
evidence, leading to sub-optimal group judgements. Third, there are
notorious problems with the direct aggregation of judgements; indeed
the literature on the direct aggregation of judgements is dominated by
impossibility theorems (see e.g. List 2012).
In order to lend substance to an account of group deliberation and
judgement such as that sketched above, the Bayesian must of course say
something about how evidence is to be merged. Which ways of merging
evidence bases are rational?
In Williamson (2009) I suggested that the theory of belief merging (see
e.g. Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2011) might be applied to the task of
merging evidence. (Indeed, I argued there that this theory is better suited
to merging evidence than merging beliefs.) In this paper we will look more
closely at that proposal. Clearly, in order to evaluate a normative theory of
evidence, one needs to have some sort of rudimentary understanding of
what evidence is. We shall consider in turn several accounts of evidence –
evidence is knowledge (§3); evidence is what is fully believed (§4);
evidence is observationally set credence (§5); evidence is information (§6);
evidence is what is rationally granted (§7) – and argue for the latter
account. §8 will develop that account in more detail. Finally, §9 will
evaluate the theory of belief merging as a theory of merging evidence,
arguing that since evidence is what is rationally granted, three of the six
axioms of the theory of merging need to be reformulated.
First, some general comments on the Bayesian notion of evidence.
2. THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE
The Bayesian, whose principal concern is the relation between evidence
and belief, customarily says rather little about evidence itself. Two truisms
usually suffice.
First, evidence is what constrains rational belief. Here we should
distinguish a body of evidence from one proposition being evidence for
another: an agent’s body of evidence is what constrains her rational
belief function, while one such proposition is evidence for another if
those propositions stand in the appropriate relation (positive probabilistic
dependence, perhaps). We will solely be concerned with the agent’s body
of evidence here; not with the relational notion of evidence. An evidence
base is a basis from which one can derive a body of evidence: for instance,
{θ , θ → ϕ} is an evidence base for the body of evidence {θ , θ → ϕ, ϕ}. In
general, a body of evidence may have several evidence bases; in §9, in
order to discuss the theory of belief merging, we shall need to suppose
that each agent under consideration possesses some specific evidence base
that gives rise to their body of evidence. While in this paper we will
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mainly be concerned with bodies of evidence and evidence bases that are
sets of propositions, we do not need to assume that evidence is always
propositional.
Bayesians have various views about how evidence constrains rational
belief. For instance, some argue in favour of a Calibration norm (often
called Miller’s principle or the Principal Principle), which says that degrees
of belief should be calibrated to any physical probabilities of which there is
evidence. Other Bayesians disagree. But one constraint that all Bayesians
adhere to is that any evidence should be fully believed:
Presumption. If θ ∈ E is expressible in the agent’s language and E ∪
{P(ϕ) = 1 : ϕ ∈ E} is consistent, then PE (θ ) = 1,
where E is the agent’s whole body of evidence and PE is her rational belief
function.2
The second truism is that, when deliberating as to what belief
function to adopt, one should take all one’s evidence into account. This
is the principle of total evidence. It does not assert that all one’s evidence
will be relevant to beliefs in question, merely that an agent’s rational
belief function is constrained by her whole body of evidence. Hence the
customary notation PE for an agent’s rational belief function, where E is
the agent’s whole body of evidence.
One can use these two truisms as a springboard from which to say a
bit more about evidence.
One can distinguish, for example, rational evidence – that which
constrains rational belief – from actual evidence – that which constrains
actual belief. The Bayesian will want to say that an agent’s actual beliefs
are rational if they are formed in the right way from her actual evidence
(i.e. they adhere to the norms of Bayesianism, in that the strengths
of her beliefs are representable by probabilities, they are appropriately
constrained by her actual evidence, and whatever else is required) and the
agent is rational to take as evidence what she actually takes as evidence
(i.e. she adheres to the norms of evidence, whatever they turn out to
be). Since Bayesian epistemology is concerned with Bayesianism as a
normative theory, we can cut to the chase by focusing attention on rational
evidence and rational belief, leaving the question of the ways in which
actual evidence and actual beliefs depart from the rational for psychology
to answer. Thus in this paper an unqualified use of the word ‘evidence’
will be used to signify rational evidence, i.e. that which constrains rational
belief and satisfies norms of evidence.
2 The consistency condition is required to rule out pathological cases such as that in which
E contains both θ and PE (θ ) < 1. Consistency is taken to mean deductive consistency with
the axioms of probability.
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Furthermore, Bayesianism is supposed to be a guide to life: Bayesian
epistemology is intended to offer advice as to how to determine rational
degrees of belief that can feed into decision making, at which point
Bayesian decision theory offers advice as to which decision to take.
Given this practical goal, it should be possible to follow the norms of
Bayesianism: Bayesian epistemology is subject to the ought implies can
principle, which says that one can only require of an agent what is possible
for her to achieve. For example, in discussions of logical omniscience,
Bayesians agree that in cases such as mathematics, where one cannot
expect an agent to determine all the logical consequences of all expressible
propositions, the requirement of logical omniscience should be relaxed in
some appropriate way (Corfield 2001). The ought implies can principle also
requires that an agent’s evidence should be accessible to that agent. For if
an agent cannot – perhaps after some appropriate process of introspection,
calculation or deliberation – determine what her (rational) evidence is,
how can her (rational) degrees of belief be expected to satisfy constraints
imposed by that evidence?3
Thus any account of evidence should render evidence accessible to the
agent in question, if it is to flesh out the Bayesian theory of deliberation
and judgement outlined in §1. This implies, in particular, that the account
of evidence must avoid epistemic circularity: it cannot say that E = X if
the X in question can only be determined by appealing to the agent’s
evidence E . In particular, it cannot say that E = X if the X in question
can only be determined by appealing to the beliefs that are grounded by
the agent’s evidence E , since one would need to determine E in order to
determine those beliefs which are to be used to determine E .
In sum, we are concerned here with evidence in the sense of an agent’s
whole body of rational evidence (or an evidence base for that body). This
evidence should be accessible to the agent, and an account of evidence
should avoid epistemic circularity.
Let us turn, then, to some accounts of evidence, and evaluate them in
the light of the above discussion.
3. E = K, WHAT IS KNOWN
The question of the nature of evidence is not only of interest to Bayesian
epistemologists, but to epistemologists more generally, whose concept of
evidence is much the same:
3 As we shall see, this demand for accessibility of evidence sets Bayesian epistemology apart
from some epistemological theories, e.g. that of Timothy Williamson (2000). On the other
hand, the accessibility requirement is line with other theories, such as that of Skorupski
(2010: 21), who says, ‘if autonomy is possible it must be possible to audit one’s reasons
by reflective self-examination and thereby give a warranted answer to the question, “Do I
have sufficient reason for this belief, sentiment, or action?”’
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It seems to be a platitude about evidence that a subject’s evidence is what
that subject has to go on in trying to arrive at a view. I would go further
and add that a subject’s evidence is limited to those things that the subject
can properly treat as reasons for belief without needing antecedent justified
beliefs to justify treating these considerations as proper starting points for
deliberation. (Littlejohn 2011: 242)
Littlejohn goes on to characterize an agent’s stockpile of evidence as
the body of propositions that fix evidential probabilities (Littlejohn 2011:
248). Here ‘evidential probability’ does not refer to Kyburg’s theory of
evidential probability (see e.g. Kyburg Jr 1991) – rather, it is the name
given by Timothy Williamson (Williamson 2000: Ch: 10) to something
akin to Keynesian logical probability (Keynes 1921). Its proponents argue
that this notion of probability is to be taken as primitive, and is not
identical to rational degree of belief, but nevertheless typically grounds
rational degree of belief in the sense that, except in pathological cases, the
evidential probability of θ relative to E is the degree to which a perfectly
rational agent with total evidence E would believe θ . Hence it is fair to
say that under this view of evidence, evidence is also intended to ground
rational degree of belief, if indirectly via logical probability.
The view taken by Williamson (2000: Ch. 9) and endorsed by Bird
(2007: §2), Littlejohn (2011) and others is that evidence is knowledge,
E = K . This is meant to work both ways: everything that you know is
in your body of evidence and you know everything that is in your body
of evidence.
This account of evidence seems at first sight to be well suited to
Bayesian epistemology, since Bayesians often use ‘background knowl-
edge’ interchangeably with ‘evidence’, deeming Bayesian probability to
be relative to background knowledge in the same way that Bayesian
probability is relative to evidence. On the other hand, this account
of evidence is somewhat at odds with the intuitive understanding of
evidence since it renders some evidence far from evident: if E = K then
one cannot always determine what one’s evidence is because one cannot
always tell whether or not one knows a given proposition (Williamson
2000: §9.3).
While these considerations concern common usage and hence are
rather inconclusive, the second consideration points to a serious objection:
evidence, on this account, is inaccessible. Knowledge is true belief that
has some authority in virtue of being justified, or reliably obtained, or
suchlike. One may think one knows θ but be mistaken about its truth
or authority, and one may be in no position to correct oneself. (While
one may mistakenly think one believes θ , a Bayesian might say that in
principle one can decide this question with a bit of effort, by observing
one’s own betting tendencies.) Hence, given the ought implies can principle,
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 23 Feb 2015 IP address: 129.12.18.193
DELIBERATION, JUDGEMENT AND THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE 35
it is hard to see how one could be deemed irrational for failing to accord
one’s degrees of belief with one’s evidence, if E = K . Williamson (2000:
§9.3) bites the bullet here, partly because his version of evidence is
used to constrain his version of evidential probability, which is equally
inaccessible. But this move is no consolation to the Bayesian who remains
in need of accessible evidence so that the norms of Bayesian epistemology
can have normative force in practical applications.
The proponent of E = K might respond that while we may be
mistaken about our evidence we are typically not, in which case evidence
is accessible enough to constrain rational degree of belief. But this is not so.
What one takes to be one’s evidence may be thought of as a conjunction θ
of a great many propositions, at least a small proportion of which turn
out false. So in practice θ is bound to be false and will not qualify as
knowledge. If evidence is to constrain rational degree of belief and E = K
then θ should not constrain rational degree of belief. Thus if E = K , we
are always wrong to rely on what we take to be our evidence in order
to determine our degrees of belief. Worse still, if θ is a sufficiently large
conjunction of propositions, at least one of which is false, arguably one
knows that θ is false, i.e. one knows ¬θ .4 If E = K , then one’s evidence
contains ¬θ . Thus not only does θ fail to qualify as evidence, but one’s
beliefs should be constrained by its negation: one’s evidence is exactly the
opposite of what one takes it to be!
A second serious concern for the Bayesian is that of epistemic
circularity. If E = K , then in order to decide whether some proposition
θ is evidence, one needs to determine whether θ is known and hence
whether θ is a (qualitative) rational belief. And to determine rational
beliefs one needs to isolate the evidence and investigate the constraints
that it imposes. Hence, in order to determine whether θ is evidence one
needs to have determined whether θ is evidence.
The proponent of E = K might respond that there is no circle here
because knowledge requires, not rational belief, but justified belief, or
reliable belief, or belief that is qualified in some other way. But it still
seems plausible that if a belief is to make the grade for knowledge, it will
have to be suitably constrained by evidence. Indeed an apparent minimal
condition on a knowledge-grade belief is that it should be a strong rational
belief in the Bayesian sense: for if θ is known and E = K , then θ ∈ E and
by the Presumption principle (§2), θ must be fully believed – one is not
rationally entitled to disbelieve θ . Hence the circle seems not so easily
avoided.
4 This is particularly clear when, as is frequently the case in scientific contexts, what one
takes to be one’s evidence is obtained by methods with a known level of reliability – say
99%. Then the chance of θ being true can be known to be some fixed number, small enough
to render a true belief in ¬θ knowledge. We shall return to this sort of case below.
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Bayesian epistemology is widely applied to the philosophy of science,
and a third concern that the Bayesian might have about the E = K claim
is that it does not appear to accord with the concept of evidence used in
science, which is not factive. In science, gold-standard evidence takes the
form of observations or experimental outcomes corroborated by several
independent trials. It is widely recognised that items of evidence are often
false. The ideal is not that evidence all be true, but that it be obtained
by methods deemed sound, in the hope that such methods are reliable
and yield a high probability of truth. (Truth remains a goal of enquiry,
if not a necessary condition on evidence.) In many cases, more or less
precise error bounds are introduced in order to quantify the proportion of
the evidence, or data, that is erroneous. There is no suggestion that these
data points fail to qualify as evidence, as they would if E = K , and it is
widely acknowledged that belief should be apportioned on the basis of
total evidence, false evidence as well as true.
One area which highlights the non-factive nature of evidence in
science is that of meta-analysis. A meta-analysis pools evidence from
multiple studies in order to come up with an overall recommendation.
For example, a meta-analysis for the question of whether exposure to
a toxin causes a particular disease will examine multiple studies in the
literature that bear on that question, merging the data of the studies
where possible and aggregating their results, in order to produce an
answer to the question that is based on all available evidence. A meta-
analysis of multiple well-conducted randomized controlled trials is placed
at the top of the so-called ‘evidence-hierarchies’ that pervade evidence-
based medicine and other evidence-based movements across the sciences.
So, without question, the data merged by a meta-analysis qualifies as
evidence. But the reason why meta-analysis is so important is that
evidence of any particular study can be erroneous and/or misleading. It is
precisely because evidence may be false that such evidence is best placed
in the context of a meta-analysis; the hope being that, through merging,
the size of the merged body of evidence will be large enough that there
will be proportionally little erroneous evidence.
There are two principal ways in which the proponent of E = K might
respond to the charge that evidential propositions in science are not
always true. First, the defender of E = K can distance herself from the
evidence, arguing that the evidence in question is not the evidence as
reported by a particular study, but instead E consists of propositions of
the form study S reports data D; Williamson (2000: 198–199) adopts a similar
strategy in the case of erroneous perceptual evidence. Of course this is
at odds with common parlance. Moreover, that sort of evidence would
fail to license the conclusions that scientists typically draw: data D taken
together with a claim of the form D → C will license the conclusion C , but
the meta-evidence ‘study S reports D’ fails to license that conclusion in
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the presence of D → C without some further assumption concerning the
credibility or reliability of the study. Since the reliability of any individual
study is just what is in question in contexts such as meta-analysis, that
reliability cannot be assumed. Instead, the approach taken in such cases
is to take the data of the study as evidence and draw the conclusion
defeasibly, in the awareness that evidence provided by further studies
may lead the conclusion to be reversed. Thus this first response fails to
account for the use of evidence in science.
Secondly, the defender of E = K might offer the response that
evidence must be true to make sense of basic intuitions about evidence:
Why is it bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the evidence? A
natural answer is: because then it is false. That answer assumes that
evidence consists only of true propositions. For if an untrue proposition,
p, is evidence, the proposition that p is untrue is true but inconsistent with
the evidence. (Williamson 2007: 209)
But such a claim is too quick. An alternative answer to the question of
why it is bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with evidence is: because
the assertion is then unlikely to be true. This alternative answer does
not assume that evidence consists of true propositions but merely that it
consists of propositions that are probable in some appropriate sense – an
assumption that accords much better with the use of evidence in science.
Thus far we have seen that the Bayesian might object to the E =
K claim on the grounds of inaccessibility, epistemic circularity, and
incompatibility with scientific practice. A fourth concern for the Bayesian
is that knowledge may be of too weak an epistemological standing to
qualify as evidence. An astronomer may, for instance, know that an
astronomical event has taken place merely by observing it with the
naked eye, but this may be inadequate for it to count as evidence in
an astronomical study, which can require more in the way of authority
(justification, reliability, or whatever) than does knowledge. Similarly, the
norms of evidence in a legal setting can require dimensions of authority
other than those required by knowledge: knowledge that is irrelevant to
the case in question, or hearsay, or opinion, may not count as evidence.5
The proponent of E = K might reply here that what counts as
knowledge is context-relative, and in the context of an astronomical study,
knowledge demands more than observation with the naked eye. But this
is disputable. Arguably, the astronomer does know that the event has
taken place by observing it with the naked eye – indeed, if anyone’s naked
eyes are reliable enough to yield knowledge of astronomical events, those
of a trained astronomer surely are. Moreover, astronomical evidence can
5 Legal evidence might even be non-propositional (and hence not knowledge): a murder
weapon constitutes ‘physical evidence’ for example.
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be expensive to collect, and knowledge (obtained e.g. via the naked eye)
that the event has taken place may be a prerequisite to justify the cost of
collecting evidence to support the claim that the event has taken place.
So it appears that in such cases it is evidence but not knowledge that is
context relative.
4. E = B, WHAT IS BELIEVED TO DEGREE 1
Proponents of E = K cite the claim that E = B as their official opposition,
and a standard Bayesian position (Williamson 2000: 222; Littlejohn 2011:
241). However, it is hard to find advocates of this latter view, so this may
be a straw man.6
For sure, Bayesians would endorse the claim that if a proposition
is a part of an agent’s body of evidence, then that agent ought to
believe it to degree 1 – cf. the Presumption principle of §2. But even
here there are qualifications: the agent is hardly compelled to believe
the evidential proposition to degree 1 if she cannot express or entertain
that proposition. A robot agent may be able to express (i.e. have a belief
function defined on) propositions about its location in a room, but not be
able to express propositions encapsulating the evidence it receives in its
sensors. I may see something clearly that I cannot describe – my evidence
is not then captured by a proposition that I believe to degree 1, such as
the proposition that I see something that I cannot describe; rather, my
evidence consists of propositions about what it is that I see, propositions
that are currently beyond my capacity to capture in language.
On the other hand, the Bayesian should be reluctant to endorse the
converse claim: not everything that is believed to degree 1 need qualify as
evidence. This is largely a consequence of the Bayesian thesis that degrees
of belief are probabilities; probability theory forces probability 1 on many
propositions that are highly contingent and not always evident. Examples
are provided by the strong law of large numbers, the various zero-one
laws, the claim that the Bayesian is forced to believe to degree 1 that
her degrees of belief are perfectly calibrated with empirical frequencies
(Dawid 1982), however implausible that proposition might be, and the
claim that the Bayesian is forced to believe to degree 1 that her degree of
belief in θ is x, if indeed it is the case that PE (θ ) = x (Milne 1991). Even
where probability 1 is not forced, the Bayesian may still want to insist
on awarding probability 1 to propositions that cannot be construed as
6 While Michael Bratman seems to claim that E = B when he says that ‘An agent’s beliefs
provide the default cognitive background for further deliberation and planning’ (Bratman
1992: 10), it is clear that he does not understand qualitative belief as that which is believed
to degree 1.
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evidence: for example the proposition that a dart will not hit a given point
on a dartboard viewed as a continuous disc.7
Another reason for the Bayesian to reject the E = B claim is
that epistemic circularity rears its head again. Evidence is that which
determines belief, so to find out whether one is rational to believe θ
to degree 1, one needs to ascertain whether that strength of belief is
compatible with one’s evidence, given the norms of Bayesianism. In
particular, one needs to know whether θ is in one’s body of evidence, for
if it is, then one should believe it to degree 1. But if E = B then in order to
determine whether θ is in one’s body of evidence, one needs to determine
whether it has (rational) degree of belief 1.
The proponent of E = B might try to avoid this circularity by
appealing to actual degree of belief 1 rather than rational degree of belief
1 (c.f. 2). Then, in order to determine whether one ought to believe θ to
degree 1, one needs to determine whether θ is a part of one’s evidence, i.e.
whether one actually believes θ to degree 1. But such a move trivialises
Bayesianism as a normative theory: actual degree of belief 1 becomes
sufficient for rational degree of belief 1, since PE (θ ) = 1 if θ ∈ E . Thus
if I am certain that Forest Green Rovers will win then I am rationally
compelled to be certain that they will win, regardless of what information
I have about them. Such a consequence is clearly unsatisfactory.
Finally, degree of belief 1 is too strong a condition on evidence, as
one can arguably take as evidence propositions about which one which
would be less than perfectly certain. It may appear to me that a jacket
is orange, though I view the jacket by candlelight. While norms of belief
may deem this insufficient grounds for awarding the proposition that the
jacket is orange degree of belief 1 given my other evidence (including
the evidence that the jacket appears to me to be orange), norms of evidence
may deem the observation sufficiently reliable as to count as evidence
henceforth. One might argue that every observation has this status: there
will normally be some grounds for doubt which would preclude giving
what is observed probability 1 relative to other evidence, but that does not
preclude one taking what is observed as evidence, at least provisionally.
(This view requires that evidence be defeasible. But on any view according
to which evidence is accessible, evidence turns out to be fallible: for any –
or almost any – proposition that one uses as grounds for one’s beliefs, one
can mistakenly take that proposition to be true. In which case evidence
must be defeasible if one’s beliefs are to continue to track the truth.)
7 One might object that the mark made by a dart is not a point in the geometric sense because
it has a positive area; hence this area does not have measure zero. But instead of the mark
made by the dart we can consider the horizontal projection of the centre of mass of the dart
onto the dartboard: this is a point in the geometric sense and does have Lebesgue measure
zero.
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5. E = C, CREDENCES SET BY OBSERVATION
In order to deal with cases such as observation by candlelight, Richard
Jeffrey put forward the thesis that credences that are the direct effect of
observation – for example, my 0.8 degree of belief that the jacket is orange
– are evidence in the sense that they motivate changes in other degrees of
belief (Jeffrey 1968: §2; 2004: §3.2).8
A key advantage of the E = C thesis is thus that it handles evidence
that would otherwise be less than certain. A second advantage is that
this position sidesteps the problem of inexpressible evidence, by treating
credences as a proxy for that evidence: ‘there is something about what is
seen that leads the observer to have the indicated degrees of belief . . . but
there is no reason to think this something expressible by a statement in the
observer’s language’ (Jeffrey 1968: 35).
Epistemic circularity is also less of a problem on the E = C account,
for the following reason. In order to determine what your evidence is,
you can proceed by isolating those of your actual degrees of belief that
have been directly causally determined by observation. Since you have
no control over those causally determined degrees of belief, and ought
implies can, they can hardly be deemed irrational. Hence they are rational
degrees of belief as well as actual degrees of belief, and can constrain the
rest of your rational belief function PE . So, although it may not be easy to
isolate which of your actual degrees of belief are directly determined by
observation, there is no obvious circularity here. In contrast to the E = B
case, this appeal to actual degrees of belief does not trivialize Bayesianism
as a normative theory: observationally set degrees of belief are indeed
rational as well as actual degrees of belief, and in any case there remains
scope for the normative and the descriptive to come apart with regard to
other degrees of belief.
This move to observationally set credences does come at a cost
however: observation trumps other ways of setting degrees of belief and
this is not always appropriate. Suppose that an agent knows that she is
colour blind, seeing both orange and green as the same hue of green
(protanopia). An observation might initially cause a credence of .99 that
a jacket is green. If E = C then the agent is rational to believe that the
jacket is green to degree .99. The Bayesian should agree with this: it is
rational because it is compulsory, having been causally determined by
observation. But if E = C , the agent is rational to continue with degree
of belief .99 that the jacket is green, even after ample time for reflection,
as long as that credence remains directly set by observation – i.e. as
8 For Jeffrey, such a credence need not be evidence in the sense of a reason for belief:
θ is a reason for believing ϕ if P(θ ) and P(ϕ|θ ) are both high (Jeffrey 1968: 38). An
observationally set credence is part of a body E of evidence but need not be evidence
for another proposition (cf. 2).
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long as she has not engaged in a conscious process of reflection and
deliberation which culminates in setting credence .99 by choice rather than
by direct observation. The Bayesian should disagree with this verdict:
the agent should know better. She knows that she is colour blind, and
this knowledge should lead her to engage in a process of reflection
and deliberation after direct observation, and thereby to adopt a more
moderate degree of belief in this case. However, the proponent of E = C
cannot take this route: the agent’s knowledge that she is colour blind does
not even count as evidence if that knowledge was obtained by testimony,
say, rather than direct observation. Hence the advocate of E = C must
hold that such knowledge should not constrain the agent’s degrees of
belief.
In sum, neither do all observationally set credences count as evidence
(e.g. the observationally set credence that the jacket is green, after ample
time for reflection), nor are all items of evidence observationally-set
credences (e.g. the evidence that one is colour blind). E = C fails in both
directions.
6. E = I, INFORMATION
All the views of evidence outlined above appeal to belief in one way
or another: E = K sees evidence as true qualitative belief with some
further authority; E = B sees evidence as full belief; E = C sees evidence
as partial belief. Another option is to depart from belief altogether,
construing a body of evidence as a body of information:
we may be concerned not only with what scientists actually believe (or
believed), but also with other information accessible to the community . . .
it is clear that information which has been collected as a result of human
effort but never believed can bear a confirmation (or corroboration) relation
to hypotheses in which we are interested. (Rowbottom 2014: §2)
As Rowbottom argues, it can be reasonable for an agent to take as evidence
the contents of a notebook, as well as the contents of her memory, even
if the information in her notebook is not present in her mind and thus
not actually believed. Although the agent does not actually believe the
contents of her notebook, she may be disposed to believe them, and there
is a clear sense in which they may constrain her rational degrees of belief.
One attractive feature of this view is that it offers an account of
evidence that applies equally in the case of a group’s body of evidence
as in the case of an agent’s body of evidence. In contrast, if E = C it is by
no means obvious how the notion of evidence can apply to a group whose
members have incompatible credences.
There are various worries that one might have about this view though.
One concern is that while it may not be clear what evidence is, it is,
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if anything, less clear what information is, with little agreement in the
literature as to the nature of information. As Rowbottom acknowledges,
it is far from obvious how best to answer the simple question of whether
or not information need be true. Hence an account of evidence in terms of
information may be less than helpful for the purposes of guiding formal
epistemology.
Another concern is that much hinges on how accessible the
information must be in order to count as evidence. One might think that
if ought implies can, an agent should not be deemed irrational when
her degrees of belief neglect information that she has forgotten or lost
or that was destroyed, because she cannot access that information. But
if E = I then in certain cases she can be deemed irrational. A cook may
have forgotten whether Mornay sauce contains Gruyère cheese and may
be deliberating as to how strongly she should believe that proposition.
If E = I and that information is in her notebook, then she should fully
believe or disbelieve it, because it is part of her evidence, as long as the
notebook is accessible to her. But how accessible? She may not have time
to look at her notebook; she may have left it at home; she may have lent it
to a friend far away. Indeed it seems that many of the propositions about
which we deliberate can be answered by delving into information that is
accessible in some remote sense – does that mean that we should have
firm beliefs about all these propositions? By divorcing evidence from any
sort of propositional attitude of the agent, the advocate of E = I has no
immediate answer to these questions about accessibility.
7. E = G, WHAT IS RATIONALLY GRANTED
Another option, mooted in Williamson (2010: §1.4.1), is to understand an
agent’s body of evidence as consisting of everything she takes for granted
in her current operating context. (Since we are interested here in rational
belief we shall use ‘granted’ in an unqualified way for what is rationally
granted, saving ‘actually granted’ for other cases – cf. 2.)
On the one hand, whatever constitutes evidence must be taken for
granted: E ⊆ G. This is just the familiar point that one cannot reason to
anything without presuming something else. Similarly, whatever is taken
to be the basis for one’s beliefs needs to be granted, at least provisionally.
If this were not true – if some item of evidence were open to question
in the current context – then Bayesianism would lose its normative force:
why should anyone satisfy the constraints imposed by their evidence if
the evidence itself is currently up for grabs? In particular, the Presumption
principle of 2, which is at the very core of Bayesianism, would fail. As C.I.
Lewis notes,
If what is to confirm the objective belief and thus show it probable,
were itself an objective belief and hence no more than probable, then
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the objective belief to be confirmed would only probably be rendered
probable. Thus unless we distinguish the . . . belief in which experience may
render probable, from those presentations and passages of experience which
provide this warrant, any citation of evidence for a statement about objective
reality, and any mentionable corroboration of it, will become involved in an
indefinite regress of the merely probable – or else it will go round in a circle
– and the probability will fail to be genuine. (Lewis 1946: 186.)9
On the other hand, whatever is granted must be taken as evidence: G ⊆
E . If you grant θ then your degrees of belief must satisfy the constraints
imposed by θ , for otherwise your degrees of belief are compatible with ¬θ
and you cannot be said to grant θ after all – you might be said to have
mixed views about θ , or simply to have suspicions that ¬θ .
In particular, it is clear that what you take for granted should satisfy
the Presumption principle: if θ ∈ G is expressible and G is consistent
with PG(θ ) = 1, then PG(θ ) = 1. For otherwise θ is taken for granted but
believed to degree less than one, which is problematic in the sense of
Moore’s paradox: one cannot be said to grant θ but doubt it at the same
time; those propositional attitudes are inconsistent.
In sum, then, E ⊆ G and G ⊆ E , so E = G. This view has certain
immediate advantages over the preceding views. That evidence need not
be true is a problem for E = K but not for E = G. Indeed, we often do
defeasibly grant false propositions and we can be rational to grant false
propositions: e.g. we are rational to grant propositions that are presented
to us by some sufficiently reliable process, though a small proportion of
those propositions will be false. If E = G then there is no need to assume
that evidence is articulable in an agent’s language, as there is if E = B.
E = G does not give undue weight to unreliable observations, as does
E = C . Moreover, accessibility of evidence is less of a problem for E = G
9 Lewis continues, ‘if anything is to be probable, then something must be certain’ (Lewis
1946: 186), and Jeffrey (1968: 36) takes issue with this demand for certainty when he takes
as evidence observationally set credences, which are apparently less than certain (5). But
an observationally set credence is a credence of the form P̂(θ ) = x that has been directly
caused by observation – the observation of a jacket by candlelight, for example – where
P̂ signifies actual degree of belief, as opposed to rational degree of belief PE . It is thus
P̂(θ ) = x that is in the agent’s body of evidence, not the claim that the jacket is orange, nor
the act of observation itself. And the agent cannot but grant that P̂(θ ) = x at the instant
after observation, because she cannot but believe θ to degree x, that belief having been
caused by the observation. So observationally set credences do accord with the claim that
E ⊆ G.
One reason Jeffrey objects to Lewis is that, for evidence to be certain, i.e. to have degree
of belief 1, that evidence must be expressible, which is not always the case. Here I do not
insist that all evidence be certain, merely that it be granted, and we clearly take things for
granted that we cannot articulate. Moreover, the principle of Presumption only requires
that evidence be certain where that evidence is expressible. So we can endorse Jeffrey’s
claim that evidence need not be expressible in the agent’s language.
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than for E = K or E = I . To make this last point clear, however, we will
need to look more closely at granting and norms for granting.
8. GRANTING
We take many kinds of things for granted. When arguing, we can grant
the premisses of an argument. Granting that there is evil, and that an
omniscient, omnipotent, benign god would not permit evil, one can argue
that there is no omniscient, omnipotent, benign god. By granting the
premisses we can focus on the question of the validity of the argument;
if we don’t grant the premisses then the soundness of the argument
comes into play. We grant observations. I might grant that the jacket I’m
looking at is orange, for instance. We grant metaphysical presuppositions.
Thus I take for granted that the person writing the last word of this
sentence is the same person as the person who wrote the first word of
the sentence. We grant scientific theory. One might grant the laws of
quantum mechanics when working on quantum cryptography, even if
one doesn’t know precisely what these laws are. One may also grant the
laws of Newtonian mechanics – in the knowledge that they are, strictly
speaking, false – when one thinks that it will be fruitful to do so. We grant
our assumptions. Giving a talk at an academic conference, for instance,
one might assume in the absence of contrary evidence that the audience
will understand English. We take people for granted: we grant that those
we know well will behave in certain ways. (We also grant favours, wishes
and requests, but this is a different sense of the word ‘grant’ to that used
here. There is also a negative connotation to taking someone for granted
that goes beyond what is intended here.)
By taking something for granted we presume its truth, taking the
question of its truth beyond the context of enquiry.10 It is worth stressing
the context relativity of what is taken for granted. A medical practitioner
may rightly take the efficacy of a particular medicine for granted, while
an efficacy auditor may be right to call that efficacy into question, and a
philosophical sceptic may be right to take very little for granted. What
should be taken for granted depends on the agent’s current operating
context, including the questions that the agent is seeking to answer and
the standards that are imposed on her.11
Bayesianism offers a permissive account of rational belief: we are
rational to believe what we do, given our evidence E , unless one of the
10 However, that a proposition is taken for granted does not imply that it is a ‘hinge
proposition’ in Wittgenstein’s sense. Propositions that are granted in one context may
be open to debate in other contexts, while hinge propositions are ‘exempt from doubt’
(Wittgenstein 1969: §341) and ‘incontestable’ (Wittgenstein 1969: §655).
11 See Bratman (1992: §3) for a consideration of other ways in which granting is relative to
context.
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norms of Bayesianism is contravened. As we saw in §1, this leaves room
for subjectivity, in that a rational belief function PE need not be uniquely
determined by E . Similarly, one can develop a permissive account of
rational granting, an account which can admit more than one body of
evidence as rational for an agent to adopt, by providing a set of norms
by which the agent should abide. In what follows we shall take G to be
a set of propositions that are rationally granted, and shall propose norms
that G satisfies. Equivalently, we can view G as a set of propositions that
are actually granted, and the following norms as norms that ought to be
satisfied if G is to count as rational. G thus plays a role analogous to that
of the rational belief function PE in Bayesian theory. (Here G is a set of
propositions. Colloquially, one can take for granted non-propositions –
one’s spouse, for example. But in so doing one grants certain propositions
about one’s spouse’s behaviour, and it is these propositions that are
included in the set G.)
G1: G is consistent.
This norm appeals to a broader notion of consistency than logical
consistency. Not only should G not contain any logical contradictions,
but it should be satisfiable in principle by the relevant propositional
attitudes. Thus G = {θ , PG(θ ) < 1} is inconsistent because one cannot
grant a proposition yet, having granted it, grant that one believes its
negation to some extent.12 This norm might seem trivial: if one cannot
have propositional attitudes that satisfy certain constraints, then one need
hardly be prohibited from adopting such attitudes. But ‘satisfiable in
principle’ is rather different to ‘satisfiable in practice’. In practice, one
might grant θ yet less than fully believe ϕ, not realising that θ and ϕ
are the same proposition. In principle, however, such attitudes are as
incompatible as granting θ and granting ¬θ . Norm G1 is intended to deem
irrational those attitudes that are incompatible in principle.
G2: G is closed under its consequences.
Similarly, norm G2 appeals to a notion of consequence that is broader
than that of logical consequence. For example, one consequence of θ
being a member of G is that PG(θ ) = 1, so this latter proposition is also
in G if θ is. One can thus formulate G2 as G = Cn(G), where Cn is the
12 One might question the legitimacy of this sort of self reference – G containing a
proposition that refers to G – and argue that the proposition PG (θ ) < 1 is not eligible
for membership in G. But a similar point applies to G = {θ , P̂(θ ) < 1}, where P̂ is actual
degree of belief, which makes no reference to G itself. One simply ought not grant a
proposition of the form θ but I don’t fully believe it.
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relevant supraclassical consequence operator. G2 entails closure under
logical consequence, and it is intended in a spirit similar to the assumption
of logical omniscience in Bayesian theory: it is an ideal that is sensible in
a wide variety of applications, but that needs to be taken with a pinch of
salt elsewhere – in mathematics, for instance.
G3: If θ is actually granted and the agent in question cannot help but
take θ for granted then θ ∈ G.
Typically, if one cannot help but grant θ then that is because one’s granting
θ has been directly caused by some cognitive process such observing
or remembering. Such processes are normally reliable – indeed we have
evolved to depend upon them because they are reliable – hence it is
reasonable to continue to depend upon them. But this norm stands even
where the processes are unreliable, such as cases of colour blindness or
systematic memory failure. This is because ought implies can (§2): one
can hardly be deemed irrational for granting what one cannot help but
grant.
After adequate time for deliberation – e.g. deliberation about one’s
colour blindness – one can help but take the propositions in question for
granted and the norm no longer applies. The question then arises as to
whether any diachronic norms can offer guidance in such a situation.
Plausibly,
G4: If θ ∈ G in some particular operating context, and proposition ϕ
is subsequently granted but the operating context remains the
same, then θ ∈ G ′, the new set of granted propositions, unless the
retraction of θ resolves some tension.
Here we shall allow ϕ to be a tautology, to cover the case in which
nothing new of substance has been granted but where there has been an
opportunity to deliberate about what one grants.
One obvious kind of tension is that in which the new evidence casts
doubt on θ . The natural way of explicating this casting of doubt is in
terms of degree of belief: we can say that the new evidence casts doubt
on θ if PGϕ−θ (θ ) is significantly lower than PG−θ (θ ), for some suitable
contraction operator −. (G − θ , the contraction of G by θ , is the result of
removing appropriate propositions from G so that θ is no longer granted.
On the other hand, G  ϕ, the revision of G by ϕ, is the result of adding
and removing appropriate propositions to G to include ϕ yet remain
consistent. We shall defer discussion of the question of which contraction
and revision operators are suitable to the end of this section.)
Another kind of tension arises when it is found that G  ϕ
is unnecessarily complex or incoherent, or lacking in some other
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epistemological virtue. The picture here is analogous to the Quinean
notion of web of belief (Quine and Ullian 1970): changes can be made
at various places to the web of what one grants in order to improve its
epistemological qualities. Note that G4 allows some propositions to be
granted just on the grounds of their contribution to the quality of the body
of what one grants, not on the grounds of their probability. For instance,
Bayesian accounts sometimes give universal hypotheses probability zero,
yet it may be rational to grant these hypotheses just on account of their
explanatory power, or the simplicity that they yield (see e.g. Williamson
2013: §3).
Another sort of tension arises in the colour-blindness example: I may
initially grant that the jacket in front of me is orange – call this θ – , and
then, later, come to realise that I may well be mistaken. In this case it
is not that new evidence has arisen that casts doubt on θ ; I previously
granted that I was colour blind and it is that which is in tension with
θ . It is just that I wasn’t previously able to take the colour blindness
into account since my granting θ was directly caused by observation.
The tension was already there but I wasn’t in a position to do anything
about it. Now I can take it into account because there has been time
for reflection. So θ is to be retracted from G not because PGϕ−θ (θ ) is
significantly lower than PG−θ (this is a case in which ϕ is tautologous and
G  ϕ − θ = G − θ ) but because PG−θ (θ ) is sufficiently low and θ offers no
mitigating epistemological virtues in this case. This, then, provides a third
way in which a tension can be resolved by retracting θ .
G5: If θ is contentious in the context of enquiry then θ 	∈ G.
Norm G5 makes explicit the fact that what is appropriate to grant depends
to some extent on the context of enquiry. Thus if one is trying to determine
whether or not θ is true, one should not simply grant θ : one should not put
beyond the context of enquiry what is up for grabs in that enquiry.
One might also propose the converse norm – if θ is uncontentious in
the context of enquiry then θ ∈ G – , but such a proposal would be rather
questionable: in the context of many early navigation problems, it was
uncontentious that the earth is flat, but it is not clear that someone who
didn’t take this claim for granted would be irrational, especially given the
paucity of evidence supporting the flat-earth claim.
If E = G, norm G5 underwrites the commonly held view that
evidence is uncontentious or uncontroversial: ‘Think of your evidence as
the propositions that are uncontroversial for you to use in arguing for
or against other propositions. They are uncontroversial given your own
perspective . . . They are the bases of argument and inquiry, not the object
of them’ (Foley 1993: 192). However, what is taken for granted should
not simply be relative to the agent’s own perspective, but to the general
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context within which the agent operates. Thus an agent may be wrong
to grant something that her peers find contentious, especially if she is
engaged in trying to convince her peers or is subject to standards imposed
by her peers. And we shall maintain in §9 that if a group is engaged
in public deliberation then the group should not take propositions for
granted that are contentious to the individuals in the group.
Decision-Theoretic Granting. G1–5 are compelling norms of granting,
but this list is no doubt incomplete. Moreover, conflicts between norms
can arise. For example, by G3 one may end up granting something that
makes G inconsistent, contravening G1. While this tension will later be
eradicated by G4, there remains a time when G1 is infringed. As the
discussion of G2 implies, some of these norms are to be treated literally as
standards of normal epistemological behaviour, and it should be expected
that deviations from the norm can arise in certain circumstances.
Nevertheless, one can try to reconcile some of the conflicting aspects
of these norms by moving to a more unified view of rational granting. One
such unification – one that accords well with the account of judgement
given in §1 – appeals to Bayesian decision theory. Suppose that, within
some fixed context, an agent is deciding whether or not to grant some
proposition θ that may or may not already be taken for granted. If
θ is not already in G then the options for the new set G ′ of granted
propositions are G  θ (revising G to include θ ) or G − θ = G (leaving G
as it is). On the other hand if θ is already in G then the options for G ′ are
G  θ = G (leaving G as it is) or G − θ (retracting θ from G).
Arguably,
Decision-Theoretic Granting. G ′ = G  θ if and only if either
• the agent cannot help but grant θ , or
• θ is uncontentious in the current context and the expected utility
of her granting θ exceeds that of her not granting θ , relative to the
context and relative to G − θ − ¬θ .
Note that for a contraction operator, G − θ − ¬θ df= (G − θ ) − ¬θ = (G −
¬θ ) − θ . If θ 	∈ G and θ is consistent with G then G − θ − ¬θ = G. If θ 	∈
G and θ is inconsistent with G then G − θ − ¬θ = G − ¬θ . If θ ∈ G then
G − θ − ¬θ = G − θ .
This account of granting presumes an appropriate utility function
and a belief function P·(·) that maps a set of granted propositions and a
proposition under consideration to a number in the unit interval. Suppose
for example that the agent initially takes G for granted and is deciding
whether or not to add to G some proposition θ that is not already granted
but is consistent with what is already granted. In this case utilities and
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probabilities are relative to G. She might formulate the following sort of
decision table:
θ ¬θ
Grant θ 5 −4
Don’t grant θ −1 3
The expected utility of granting θ is then 5PG(θ ) − 4(1 − PG(θ )), which is
greater than the expected utility of not granting θ , −1PG(θ ) + 3(1 − PG(θ )),
just when PG(θ ) > 7/13. On the other hand, if θ 	∈ G were inconsistent
with G then assuming those elements of G that are inconsistent with
θ would prejudge the question of whether or not to grant θ ; therefore
one would need to consider probabilities and utilities relative to G − ¬θ ,
rather than G. Similarly, if θ were already granted then assuming θ
would prejudge the question of whether or not to grant θ , so utilities and
probabilities are relativized to G − θ rather than G; in this case G  θ = G.
One advantage of this decision-theoretic account is that the utility
function can encapsulate a multitude of virtues: it can award high utility
to those acts of granting that maintain consistency (G1), closure under
consequences (G2), coherence, simplicity, unification and so on (G4).
A second advantage of the decision-theoretic account is that one
can fruitfully analyse connections between utility and truth. Many
propositions θ are such that the utility of granting θ when θ is true is
greater than the utility of not granting θ when θ is true; we shall call
such propositions trutile. Many θ are such that the utility of not granting θ
when θ is false is greater than that of granting θ when θ is false; these will
be called faltile. θ in the above decision table is both trutile and faltile,
for example. Note, though, that not all propositions need satisfy these
conditions. It might be more useful to grant a universal hypothesis, for
instance, than not to grant it, even if it is strictly speaking false, as long
as it admits relatively few counterexamples. This might be because of its
simplicity, strength, and/or unifying power in the context of other granted
propositions. In which case such a hypothesis is not faltile.
One consequence is that an uncontentious proposition θ should be
granted if it is trutile and PG−θ−¬θ (θ ) = 1. To see this consider a general
decision table:
θ ¬θ
Grant θ w x
Don’t grant θ y z
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If θ is open to deliberation but uncontentious, then by Decision-
Theoretic Granting, θ should be granted if the expected utility of granting
θ exceeds that of not granting θ :
wPG−θ−¬θ (θ ) + xPG−θ−¬θ (¬θ ) > yPG−θ−¬θ (θ ) + zPG−θ−¬θ (¬θ ),
i.e. if
(w − y)PG−θ−¬θ (θ ) > (z − x)PG−θ−¬θ (¬θ )(1)
If θ is trutile then the left-hand side of Equation 1 is positive; since
PG−θ−¬θ (θ ) = 1, the right-hand side is zero; hence, θ should be granted.
This fact allows one to put beyond the context of enquiry many
propositions that are certain on the basis of what one already grants,
allowing one to focus one’s deliberation on those propositions that are
less secure in the sense of being contentious or less certain. Arguably,
this consequence captures what is plausible behind the converse of G5,
discussed above.
Another consequence of such an analysis is that an uncontentious
proposition θ should be granted if it is trutile but not faltile, as long as
PG−θ−¬θ (θ ) > 0. (The left-hand side of Equation 1 is positive and the right-
hand side is not.) In the case of the universal hypothesis, it may well be
that PG−θ−¬θ (θ ) = 0, so the left-hand side of Equation 1 is zero. But if θ
is strictly non-faltile, i.e. x > z, then the right-hand side of Equation 1 is
negative and one should in any case grant θ .
Note that, by presupposing a belief function PG as well as a utility
function, the second disjunct of the Decision-Theoretic Granting criterion
presupposes a previous set G of granted propositions. When it comes to
determining an initial set of granted propositions, only the first disjunct
can apply: θ ∈ G iff the agent cannot help but grant θ . So, before starting
to deliberate about what one should grant, the suggestion is that one
should begin with what one actually and unavoidably grants; the process
of deliberation transforms this set of propositions into one that can have
greater overall utility.
Accessibility of evidence. Having made some tentative first steps
towards a normative account of granting, we can return to main theme
of this paper, namely the nature of evidence. The question remains as to
whether, under the account provided in this paper, an agent’s evidence
is accessible to her. If not, she cannot be expected to use her evidence to
constrain her degrees of belief via the Bayesian norms.
But if, as argued, E = G, then it should be clear that an agent’s body
of evidence is in principle accessible to her, in a way that it couldn’t be if
E = K , say.
Note first that there are two chief ways in which one might demand
that evidence be accessible. As far as the Bayesian is concerned, in order to
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deliberate about how strongly to believe various propositions of interest,
the agent does not need to be able to articulate her body of evidence in
propositional form – she merely needs to be able to identify the constraints
that evidence imposes on her degrees of belief via the Bayesian norms.
On the other hand, in order to deliberate about whether or not to grant a
proposition θ , she needs a belief function and utility function relative to a
prior body of evidence E . This second task requires perhaps a stronger
sense of accessibility, since not only does it require accessibility in the
Bayesian sense (in order to determine the belief function), but also the
agent needs to be able to assess epistemic qualities of evidence, such as its
consistency or coherence, in order to determine the utility of adding θ to
her body of evidence. In neither case, though, is there a requirement that
the agent be able to articulate each and every item of evidence.
In §3 we saw why, if E = K , evidence is not sufficiently accessible: the
agent cannot be expected to correctly identify what she knows, because for
any proposition that she thinks she knows she might be mistaken about
its truth or authority, for reasons beyond her ken. If the agent is wrong
about what she knows, she may be wrong about the constraints that her
evidence imposes on her belief function. And she may be wrong about
the epistemic qualities of her evidence and the utility of adding a further
proposition to her evidence. Hence E = K can satisfy neither the Bayesian
demands on evidence nor the demands of a decision-theoretic normative
account of evidence analogous to that given above.
If, on the other hand, E = G, as argued in §7, then the agent’s
evidence is sufficiently accessible. The agent can reasonably be expected
to determine what she ought to grant, since, under the above decision-
theoretic account, this depends only on what she unavoidably grants,
what is contentious in the current context, her belief function relative
to what she currently grants, and her utility function; these are all in
principle accessible to the Bayesian agent who has time to deliberate and
introspect.
Revision and Contraction. For the sake of completeness, we shall now
turn to the question of which contraction and revision operators are suited
to the needs of the Bayesian. Consider some given propositional attitude
that involves somehow endorsing the propositions in question – an attitude
such as judging, granting, believing, accepting, predicting etc. Fix E for
the moment and suppose AP is the set of propositions that an agent with
Bayesian belief function P = PE (·) currently endorses, for that particular
endorsing attitude. (We need not assume that this set of propositions
depends only on the agent’s belief function; it may depend on utilities
as well, for instance, or on the question being asked.) A question  asks
which member of a partition  = {ψ1, . . . , ψk} of propositions is true. An
agent might try to answer this question by endorsing some proposition
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from this partition or by endorsing some logically complex proposition
built up from propositions in .
Lin and Kelly (2012) put forward the following desiderata that one
might expect an endorsed set of propositions AP and a revision operator
 to satisfy. (While they focus on acceptance as the endorsing attitude in
question, their discussion can be generalized to other endorsing attitudes.)
Non-Sceptical. Each complete answer ψi to  is endorsed over some open
neighbourhood of probability functions. This precludes AP such that
ψi is endorsed if and only if P(ψi ) = 1.
Non-Opinionated. There is some open subset of probability functions
over which a disjunction of members of  is endorsed.
Consistent. For all P , AP is consistent.
Corner Monotone. If ψi is endorsed at P then it is endorsed for
every convex combination of P and Pi , where Pi is defined as the
probability function that gives probability 1 to ψi .
Track Conditioning. AP  θ = AP(·|θ) if P(θ ) > 0. Thus if one revises
the set of endorsed propositions on learning θ , the resulting set of
propositions should tally with that that would have been endorsed
had the agent conditionalized on θ .
Note that not all Bayesians accept Bayesian conditionalization as a
universal rule of updating: some argue that conditionalization fails
in certain cases (Earman 1992: 51; Howson 1997; Williamson 2011).
Nevertheless, all Bayesians would want belief updating to agree with
conditionalization in other cases – Bayesians would not want a revision
operator that forced disagreement with conditionalization even in non-
pathological cases.
It turns out that when the question has at least three answers, the
standard approach to belief revision – AGM revision (Alchourrón et al.
1985) – doesn’t satisfy these desiderata (Lin and Kelly 2012: Corollary
1). This is because AGM revision satisfies the following condition which
prevents it from both tracking conditioning and being non-opinionated:
Accretion. If θ is consistent with AP then AP  θ = Cn(AP ∪ {θ}), the
closure of AP ∪ {θ} under its consequences.
On the other hand, certain implementations of Shoham revision (Shoham
1987) do satisfy these desiderata. For some given threshold ti j ,
define:
ψi ≺ ψ j ⇔ P(ψi )P(ψ j ) > ti j .
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 23 Feb 2015 IP address: 129.12.18.193
DELIBERATION, JUDGEMENT AND THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE 53
The relation ≺ orders propositions according to relative strength of belief.
For example, if ti j = 1 and ψi ≺ ψ j then ψi is more strongly believed
than ψ j . When ≺ is a partial order, the Shoham revision AP  θ is
defined to be the disjunction of those of the answers ψi consistent with
θ that are minimal (i.e. most strongly believed) with respect to ≺. This
Shoham revision operator does satisfy the desiderata (Lin and Kelly 2012:
Theorem 3).
Since the agent faces a decision as to whether or not to endorse a
given proposition, the Bayesian might be inclined towards a decision-
theoretic account of endorsement, such as the decision-theoretic approach
to judgement of §1 and the decision-theoretic approach to granting
presented above. Such an account can induce a suitable Shoham revision
operator, as we shall now see. Write ψi for the option endorse ψi and ψ
×
i
for don’t endorse ψi . Suppose the utility of a type II error is independent
of the answer to the question, U(ψi |¬ψi ) = U(ψj |¬ψ j ) for all i , j . As
a convention, let that constant utility be zero (utilities can be translated
by a constant without affecting which option maximizes expected utility).
Then let ψi ≺ ψ j iff ψi has higher expected utility than ψj . That is, iff
P(ψi )U(ψi |ψi ) + P(¬ψi )U(ψi |¬ψi )





U(ψj |ψ j )
U(ψi |ψi )
.
This is a partial order if U(ψi |ψi ) > 0 for i = 1, . . . , k. Such a partial
order is of the form required to induce a Shoham revision operator that
satisfies the desiderata outlined above. Note that the utility function U
will depend on the endorsement attitude in question, i.e. on the particular
interpretation of AP . Note also that if more than one answer ψi is minimal
(i.e. if there is more than one answer whose endorsement would have
maximum expected utility) then one should endorse the disjunction of
those answers.
In sum, then, a decision-theoretic account of endorsement can be used
to generate a Shoham revision operator. This in turn yields an operator
 for revising a set of endorsed propositions to accommodate a newly
endorsed proposition θ .
Having isolated one or more appropriate revision operators, the
question then arises as to which constraints contraction operators should
satisfy if they are to be suited to the need of Bayesian epistemology.
This question is typically answered indirectly by appealing to the Harper
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identity,
AP − θ = (AP  ¬θ ) ∩ AP .
The idea here is that a contraction operator is deemed appropriate just
in case it is related to some appropriate revision operator via the Harper
identity.
9. MERGING EVIDENCE
Thus far we have argued for a particular notion of evidence – namely
E = G, i.e. evidence is what is rationally granted – and have made some
tentative suggestions as to norms on rational granting. In this section
we shall return to the question posed in §1: how should the evidence of
individual agents be merged for the purposes of public deliberation and
judgement?
Norms for merging evidence. Belief merging is a formal approach to
the merging ‘belief bases’ or ‘knowledge sets’ (see e.g. Konieczny and
Pino Pérez 2011). One might thus presume that this formalism would be
appropriate for merging evidence, if only E = B or E = K . Having argued
instead that E = G, the question arises as to whether the belief merging
formalism remains appropriate for merging evidence. In Williamson
(2009) I suggested that it does remain the appropriate formalism. Here
I would like to re-evaluate that claim. We will see that in fact the axioms
of belief merging need to be altered somewhat if they are to be applied to
merging evidence.
There are two sets of norms for belief merging in the literature: one
for merging in the presence of integrity constraints, constraints that must
be satisfied by the merged set of propositions, and another for merging
in the absence of integrity constraints. For our purposes it will suffice
to consider the latter, simpler set of norms for merging in the absence of
integrity constraints.
Consider a multiset of evidence bases E = {E1, . . . , En}. Each Ei
is a consistent set of propositions (represented in, say, propositional
logic) that constitutes the evidence base of individual i . The notation
Ei is customarily used to denote either this set of propositions or
the conjunction of those propositions. Denote by E unionsq F the multiset
{E1, . . . , En, F1, . . . , Fm}. Two such multisets are equivalent, E ≡ F , if there
is a bijection f from E to F such that the corresponding evidence bases
are logically equivalent, Ei ≡ f (Ei ). We will use the symbol  to denote
a merging operator, i.e. a mapping from a multiset of individual evidence
bases to their merger, the group evidence base (again, thought of as either
a set of propositions or the conjunction of these propositions). Konieczny
and Pino Pérez (1998) proposed the following norms of merging:
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M1. E is consistent.
M2. If
∧ E is consistent then E =∧ E .
M3. If E ≡ F then E ≡ F .
M4. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then {Ei , E j } 	|= Ei .
M5. E ∧ F |= (E unionsq F).
M6. If E ∧ F is consistent then (E unionsq F) |= E ∧ F .
Let us consider these norms in turn. We shall assume a fixed context
of enquiry. In particular, we shall assume that the context of enquiry of
the group is the same as that of each of its individuals. Otherwise, the
evidence of certain individuals may be irrelevant to that of the group.
M1 requires that the group evidence base be consistent. If evidence is
what is rationally granted, this is reasonable – indeed, norm G1 on rational
granting is itself a consistency norm.
M2 says that if the individual evidence bases are mutually consistent
then the merged evidence base should simply conjoin the individual
evidence bases. This is too strong: a group is not rationally compelled
to take for granted anything that anyone grants. While it may be the
case that an individual has observed something that the other individuals
in the group were not in a position to observe, and in such a case it is
reasonable for the group evidence to include that item of evidence, in
other situations the individuals may disagree as to whether a particular
proposition qualifies as evidence. Thus if θ ∈ Ei but θ 	∈ E j , that may be
because individual j has considered θ and decided not to grant it, and
for good reason. This renders θ open to deliberation. Thus there is no
normative imperative for the group to simply take θ for granted.
Although M2 is not plausible if E = G, certain weakenings of M2 are
plausible. Thus we might replace M2 with:
M2a. If Ei |= θ for all i then E |= θ .
M2b.
∧ E |= E .
M2a says that the group should grant anything that everyone grants,
while M2b says that the group evidence base should not imply anything
that no individual grants. Arguably the group should grant everything
that everyone grants whether or not the individual evidence bases are
mutually consistent: since each individual evidence base is consistent, all
such propositions are uncontroversial. For a set G of sentences, let [G] be a
canonical finite evidence base for G (e.g. take [G] to contain only sentences
in disjunctive normal form). Then, M2a and M2b are equivalent to:
M2∗.
∧ E |= E |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )].
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One might worry that the problem of spurious unanimity (Mongin
2005) is a problem for M2∗. In this sort of situation, everyone grants θ but
for different and mutually inconsistent reasons. M2∗ would require that θ
be granted by the group as a whole, even though the group fails to grant
any of the grounds for θ , which are controversial. Is this consequence of
M2∗ undesirable? It would only seem so, if one were to maintain that
a group should grant the grounds for any proposition that the group
grants. But it would be hard to maintain such a principle, for two reasons.
First, it introduces a problem of justificatory regress. There would be no
finite evidence base that could be adopted by the group, unless these
propositions were themselves self-justifying or mutually justifying. While
the foundationalist might accept the first option, justificatory autonomy,
and the coherentist might condone the second, justificatory circularity,
neither option would appeal to the infinitist who holds that chains of
justification never terminate. Second, it seems too demanding to impose
a principle on the group that none of its constituent individuals is likely
to satisfy. If the evidence bases of the individuals are not closed under
justification, but their merger is to be closed under justification, then the
justification must be plucked from thin air, as it were. Arguably, then,
spurious unanimity does not provide a reason to reject M2∗.
M3 says that if E and F are equivalent then E and F are logically
equivalent; this does seem reasonable, as there is no further contextual
information that distinguishes E and F . Similarly for M4, which says that
one individual should not trump another where they disagree. This seems
plausible, not on the grounds of fairness to the individuals, as suggested
by Konieczny and Pino Pérez (1998) – we are concerned with determining
the best group evidence, not with treating individuals equitably – , but on
the grounds that, since it is the evidence itself that is in question, there is
nothing yet taken for granted that can tell us who should trump whom.
Note that this condition does not imply that, where the evidence of two
subgroups is inconsistent, the evidence of the group as a whole should not
coincide with that of one of the subgroups. For example, if E = {{θ}} and
F = {{θ , ϕ}, {θ , ¬ϕ}} then it is reasonable that (E unionsq F) |=∧ E although∧ E ∧∧F is inconsistent. Indeed this conclusion is underwritten by M2a.
One might suggest that if a large group of individuals all take θ as
evidence but for a single dissenter granting ¬θ , then the majority should
prevail and the group as a whole should grant θ . While such a suggestion
is permitted by M4, it should arguably be rejected in any case. This
is because this sort of disagreement is substantial enough to render θ
contentious and thus not admissible for granting by the group. In order
to rule out this sort of scenario, we need a strengthening of M4:
M4∗. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then {Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } 	|= Ei .
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(A weaker sort of majority rule is more plausible: if the majority grant θ
but the minority do not grant θ , then θ may not be contentious and it can
be appropriate for the group to grant θ . This form of majority rule remains
compatible with M4∗.)
M5 says that merging the evidence of two subgroups should not yield
propositions that are not implied by the merged evidence of one or other
subgroup. This seems fairly intuitive: it is hard to argue in the absence
of further evidence that the group as a whole should take something
for granted that is logically stronger than what the two subgroups grant
individually, when what they grant individually is simply pooled. Note
that as long as {Ei } = Ei (which is implied by M2a), M5 implies M2b.
M6 says that the group as a whole should grant everything implied by
what two subgroups grant individually, when pooled and consistent. This
seems too strong for similar reasons to those invoked in the discussion
of M2: a group is not compelled to grant everything granted by each
subgroup, because the subgroups in question may disagree as to whether
or not to grant some proposition, rendering that proposition contentious.
Plausibly, though, M6 can be weakened to:
M6∗. If E |= θ and F |= θ then (E unionsq F) |= θ .
Note that as long as {Ei } = Ei , M6∗ implies M2a, as can be seen by
induction on n.
Taking into account the suggested modifications, we are thus left with
the following list of norms:
M1. E is consistent.
M2∗.
∧ E |= E |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )].
M3. If E ≡ F then E ≡ F .
M4∗. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then {Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } 	|= Ei .
M5. E ∧ F |= (E unionsq F).
M6∗. If E |= θ and F |= θ then (E unionsq F) |= θ .
An example of a merging operator that satisfies these norms is E df=
[
⋂n
i=1 Cn(Ei )] (see Proposition 1 in the Appendix). According to this
merging operator, the group only grants everything that each member of
the group grants.
Interestingly the following merging operator satisfies the first five
norms but not M6∗ (Proposition 2, Appendix): E df=∨{∧G : G ∈ PˆE},
where PˆE is the set of maximal consistent sub-multisets of E . According to
this merging operator, the group grants the disjunction of what is granted
by maximal consistent subgroups. Moreover, another plausible merging
operator fails M5 as well as M6∗ (see below). In the light of this, one might
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take the view that M5 and M6∗ are too strong. We shall view the first four
norms as the core norms of evidence merging, with the addition of M5 and
M6∗ characterizing what might be called merging with sub-group conformity.
Contentious propositions. To say much more about norms for merging
evidence, one would need more to go on than just the individual evidence
bases E1, . . . , En. Let us suppose we also know the set CE of propositions
that are contentious for the group. (For example, if the agents all conform
to the decision-theoretic account of granting outlined above, and one
knows each individual’s belief function Pi and utility function Ui then one
can determine, for any particular proposition θ , how close the individual
is to rationally granting θ . This last can be measured by the difference
between the individual’s expected utility of granting θ and her expected
utility of not granting θ , i.e. EPi Ui (θ
) − EPi Ui (θ×). If this is strongly
negative for some individual, then that is a sense in which θ is contentious
for that individual. Given some small negative threshold τ , say that θ is τ -
uncontentious if EPi Ui (θ
) − EPi Ui (θ×) > τ for i = 1, . . . , k, and let CE = CτE
be the set of propositions that are τ -contentious.)
Presumably CE will satisfy the following conditions:
C1: If Ei |= ¬θ for some i then θ ∈ CE .
C2: If Ei |= θ for all i then θ 	∈ CE .
C3: If θ ≡ ϕ then θ ∈ CE iff ϕ ∈ CE .
C4: CE ∪ CF ⊆ CEunionsqF .
The extra information embodied in CE can be taken into account in the
norms for merging. In particular, we can formulate:
M2c. If Ei |= θ for all i and θ 	∈ CE , then E |= θ .
M6c. If E |= θ , F |= θ and θ 	∈ CEunionsqF , then (E unionsq F) |= θ .
Note that given C2, M2c is equivalent to M2a. Hence there is no need to
replace M2∗.
This extra information also motivates a further protocol for merging
evidence. Let E df= [{θ 	∈ CE : some Ei |= θ}]. According to this merging
operator, the group grants any uncontentious proposition that is granted
by some individual in the group. This operator satisfies M1–5, as well as
M6c (Proposition 3, Appendix).
The Social Entropy Process. Wilmers (2010) offers the following
alternative account of public deliberation by merging evidence. First, let
Ei be the set of probability functions that satisfy constraints imposed by
evidence base Ei , for i = 1, . . . , n. Attention is restricted to the case in
which all the Ei are closed and convex. Then simultaneously determine
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of the Kullback-Leibler divergences of P from the Pi . If P is not uniquely
determined, but merely constrained to lie in a set E of probability
functions, then choose P ∈ E that has maximum entropy. The resulting
function P is the group’s belief function. Wilmers (2010) justifies this
procedure, called the social entropy process, on the grounds that it satisfies a
number of desiderata that, he maintains, a public deliberation procedure
should satisfy.
There are two main points of difference between the social entropy
process and the approach of this paper. First, the social entropy process
was put forward as a way of generalizing the maximum entropy
principle (Jaynes 1957), which is often applied in the context of individual
deliberation, to public deliberation.13 The maximum entropy principle is
core to some versions of objective Bayesianism (e.g. Williamson 2010), but
is eschewed by other kinds of Bayesianism. In contrast, the methods of
this paper are neutral regarding the underlying view of Bayesianism.
Second, the evidence bases Ei are not sets of propositions formulated
in propositional logic. In fact as Wilmers acknowledges, the social
entropy process does not handle propositional evidence very well: if one
individual has θ as evidence – i.e. gives probability 0 to ¬θ – then the
group as a whole must take θ as evidence; hence the process cannot
cope with the situation in which one individual has evidence θ but
another individual has evidence ¬θ . So the evidence bases must instead
be thought of as attaching non-extreme probabilities to propositions, e.g.
to contain statements of the form θ X where X is a closed interval of
probabilities or a single probability that is not 0 or 1. Wilmers (2010: §1) is
clear that these probabilities are credences, so the view of evidence behind
the social entropy process is closer to the E = C view criticized in §5 than
to the E = G view advocated in §7, with the further restriction that the
credences should not be the extreme values 0 or 1.
But there is an important sense in which the social entropy process
does fit the general approach of this paper. The group belief function P
is determined from the individuals’ evidence bases Ei rather than their
belief functions – in line with the discussion of public deliberation in §1.
Moreover, the set E of probability functions obtained at the first step of
the social entropy process can be thought of as representing the group
evidence base. Thought of in that way, the social entropy process induces
13 Kern-Isberner and Rödder (2004) offer another approach with a similar goal.
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a merging operator that satisfies versions of the original merging norms
M1–6 (Adamcik and Wilmers 2014).
We saw above that some of the norms M1–6 are overly restrictive
as norms of evidence merger, and need to be changed. Hence the social
entropy process inherits these restrictive characteristics. Suppose, for
instance, that in a large group, the evidence bases of all individuals but
one attach probability 0.9 to θ . Then the evidence of the majority must hold
sway in the group and will swamp the evidence of a dissenter who has a
lower probability for θ . In such a case the social entropy process forces
a group belief in θ that is close to 0.9. In contrast, the evidence-merger
process advocated in this paper can deem substantial disagreement about
θ enough to render θ contentious and open to deliberation, in which case
there is no constraint imposed on the group belief function that forces a
strong belief in θ . Thus one can argue that the evidence of dissenters can
be given too little weight under the social entropy process.
On the other hand there are cases in which the evidence of a lone
dissenter can be given too much weight. Suppose that in a large group
the evidence bases of all individuals attach the interval [0.3, 0.5] to some
atomic proposition θ . Then the social entropy process would say that the
group degree of belief in θ should be 0.5. Now the group is joined by
a new individual who attaches probability x < 0.3 to θ . The presence of
this outlier forces the group evidence base to give θ a fixed probability
that is lower than 0.3. (Hence the group degree of belief in θ moves from
0.5 to below 0.3, however large the original group.) As in the previous
example, this seems too restrictive: the evidence of the group is very
tightly constrained when there is a lone dissenter. But in this case, the
dissenter’s opinion perhaps leads to too much movement away from
the opinion of the majority. Indeed, by taking x to be small enough, the
opinion of the group can be forced to be arbitrarily close to zero.
This sort of case can also arise when the individual evidence bases
are mutually consistent. Suppose for instance that all individuals use
data from a sample to determine a confidence interval estimate of the
probability of θ . Almost all individuals operate at the 99% level to attach
an interval of [0.3, 0.5] to θ . But a lone dissenter is prepared to attach a
95% confidence interval of [0.36, 0.44] to θ . Merger norm M2 (and thus the
social entropy process) would take the group evidence to be characterized
by the narrower interval, since that interval represents the conjunction of
the individuals’ mutually consistent evidence bases. But this would give
too much weight to the lone dissenter: it is precisely the width of the
confidence interval that is contentious here. Arguably one should take the
wider interval as the group evidence in this case, as it is uncontentious to
all that the probability of θ is within that interval.
Note that this last example is merely one instance of a very general
problem. We often appeal to confidence or reliability considerations
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when deciding what to take as our evidence. Moreover, these confidence
thresholds are often contentious. M2 would require that, when the
individuals’ evidence bases are mutually consistent, the group evidence
base should be determined by the more specific evidence, which tends to
be the evidence yielded by the confidence thresholds that are most lax. But
this is perverse – arguably in such cases the group evidence should be the
evidence that all the individuals are prepared to endorse.
In sum, while the social entropy process is an interesting proposal that
fits with the general approach to public deliberation outlined in §1, it is
aligned with the E = C view of evidence and it conforms to the standard
merger norms M1–6 – two considerations that leave it open to criticism.
An alternative approach to handling evidence bases which can
contain information of the form θ X, where θ is a proposition and X is
an interval set of probabilities attaching to θ , is to take the convex hull
of those sets of probability functions determined by maximal consistent
subsets of evidence bases (see e.g. Williamson 2010: §7.3). In this case
E = 〈{P : P satisfies some G ∈ PˆE}〉, where 〈·〉 is the convex hull operator,
and E df= {θ X : P(θ ) ∈ X for all P ∈ E}. This merging operator satisfies the
core norms for evidence merger outlined above (Proposition 4, Appendix).
Moreover, this approach is quite compatible with E = G, particularly if
one interprets the probabilities as non-epistemic – i.e. if the evidence
is construed as evidence of chances, rather than as credences set by
observation.
10. SUMMARY
We have seen in this paper that a natural Bayesian account of public
deliberation and judgement demands that evidence be merged (§1). But
before one can say how evidence should be merged, one needs a better
understanding of what evidence is. Bayesianism places certain demands
on evidence (§2), and evidence cannot be what is known (§3), what is
fully believed (§4), observationally set credence (§5), or information (§6).
This paper has argued instead that evidence is what is rationally taken for
granted (§7), and has attempted to specify some norms of granting (§8). If
this claim is correct then the standard axioms of merging should be altered
if they are to be applied to merging evidence (§9).
Of course the question remains as to whether we can live up to the
demands placed on us by such an account of public deliberation and
judgement. The reader might be sceptical as to whether this sort of account
is relevant to political situations, for instance, where an individual’s main
aim may be to thwart opponents and where evidence can be somewhat
sidelined. However, where there is genuine common interest and where
evidence can be made explicit – e.g. in certain scientific committees, drug
approval committees, legal committees and in multi-agent systems in
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AI – there is clearly some scope to apply an account of public deliberation
and judgement that proceeds by merging evidence.
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Appendix: Examples of merging operators
Proposition 1. Norms M1, M2∗, M3, M4∗, M5 and M6∗ are satisfied by the merging
operator E = [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )].
Proof:
M1. E is consistent because each Ei is consistent.
M2∗. This holds because
∧ E |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )].
M3. If E ≡ F then⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei ) =⋂ni=1 Cn(Fi ) so E = F .
M4∗. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then Cn(Ei ) ∩ · · · ∩ Cn(Ei ) ∩ Cn(E j ) = Cn(Ei ) ∩
Cn(E j ) ⊂ Cn(Ei ). So there is a θ ∈ Cn(Ei ) such that {Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } 	|= θ .
M5. E ∧ F = [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )] ∧ [⋂mi=1 Cn(Fi )] |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )] |=
[
⋂n
i=1 Cn(Ei ) ∩
⋂m
i=1 Cn(Fi )] = (E unionsq F).
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M6∗. If E |= θ and F |= θ then θ ∈⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei ) ∩⋂mi=1 Cn(Fi ) so (E unionsq F) |= θ .

Proposition 2. Norms M1, M2∗, M3, M4∗, M5 are satisfied by the merging operator
E =∨{∧G : G ∈ PˆE}, but M6∗ is not satisfied.
Proof:
M1. A disjunction of consistent propositions is consistent.
M2∗.
∧ E |=∧G for each G ∈ PˆE so ∧ E |= E . Now each Ei |=⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei ) so∧G |=⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei ) for each G ∈ PˆE and E |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )].
M3. If E ≡ F then PˆE ≡ PˆF , so E ≡ F .
M4∗. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then Pˆ{Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } = {{Ei , . . . , Ei }, {E j }}. Hence,
{Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } = Ei ∨ E j 	|= Ei .
M5. If G ∈ Pˆ(E unionsq F) then G = E ′ unionsq F ′ for some consistent sub-multisets E ′ of
E and F ′ of F , one or other of which might be empty. (E unionsq F) is a
disjunction of such
∧G. Now for each such G there are maximal consistent
sub-multisets E ′′ of E and F ′′ of F such that∧ E ′′ |=∧ E ′ and∧F ′′ |=∧F ′.
So each of the disjuncts of (E unionsq F) is logically implied by a disjunct
of
∨{∧ E ′′ ∧∧F ′′ : E ′′ ∈ PˆE ,F ′′ ∈ PˆF}. But E ∧ F ≡∨{∧ E ′′ ∧∧F ′′ :
E ′′ ∈ PˆE ,F ′′ ∈ PˆF}, so E ∧ F |= (E unionsq F).
To see that M6∗ is not satisfied, take E = {{θ , ψ1}, {ϕ, ψ2}} and F = {{¬θ , ψ2},
{¬ϕ, ψ1}}; then PˆE = {E} and PˆF = {F} so E |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 and F |=
ψ1 ∧ ψ2, but (E unionsq F) 	|= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 because Pˆ(E unionsq F) = {E ,F , {{θ , ψ1}, {¬ϕ, ψ1}},
{{¬θ , ψ2}, {ϕ, ψ2}}} and the latter two sub-multisets do not entail ψ1 ∧ ψ2. 
Proposition 3. Given C1–4, norms M1, M2∗, M3, M4∗, M5 and M6c are satisfied by the
merging operator E df= [{θ 	∈ CE : some Ei |= θ}].
Proof:
M1. C1 guarantees that E is consistent.
M2∗.
∧ E |= E because for any θ ∈ E , some Ei |= θ . E |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )] by
C2.
M3. C3 ensures that if E ≡ F then E ≡ F .
M4∗. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then there is some θ such that Ei |= θ but E j |= ¬θ .
By C1, θ ∈ C{Ei ,E j } ⊆ C{Ei ,...,Ei ,E j } by C4. Hence {Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } 	|= Ei .
M5. If (E unionsq F) |= θ then some Ei |= θ or some F j |= θ and θ 	∈ CEunionsqF so by C4
θ 	∈ CE and θ 	∈ CF . Hence E ∧ F |= θ .
M6c. If E |= θ then some Ei |= θ . So if θ 	∈ CEunionsqF then (E unionsq F) |= θ . 
Proposition 4. Suppose all propositions are of the form θ X where θ is a sentence of a
propositional language and X is a convex set of probabilities. Let E = 〈{P : P satisfies
some G ∈ PˆE}〉. Then E df= {θ X : P(θ ) ∈ X for all P ∈ E} satisfies norms M1, M2∗, M3,
M4∗.
Proof: We write P |= θ X for P(θ ) ∈ X. Note that satisfaction is closed under convex
combinations: if P |= θ X and Q |= θ X then λP + (1 − λ)Q |= θ X for l ∈ [0, 1]. This can
be seen as follows. R = λP + (1 − λ)Q is defined by R(ω) = λP(ω) + (1 − λ)Q(ω) for
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each state (possible world) ω of the propositional language. R(θ ) =∑ω|=θ λP(ω) + (1 −
λ)Q(ω) = λ∑ω|=θ P(ω) + (1 − λ)∑ω|=θ Q(ω) = λP(θ ) + (1 − λ)Q(θ ) ∈ X since X is
convex.
M1. Note that E is a non-empty, convex set of probability functions. Hence if E |= θ X
and E |= θY then X ⊆ Y or vice versa.
M2∗. If
∧ E is inconsistent then trivially∧ E |= E . Otherwise, PˆE = {E} and E |=
θ X iff P(θ ) ∈ X for all P satisfying ∧ E , i.e., ∧ E |= E . Now if Ei |= θ X for all
i then
∧G |= θ X for each G ∈ PˆE , so P |= θ X for all P ∈ E (satisfaction being
closed under convex combination), and E |= [⋂ni=1 Cn(Ei )].
M3. If E ≡ F then PˆE ≡ PˆF and E = F, so E = F .
M4∗. If Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent then Pˆ{Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } = {{Ei , . . . , Ei }, {E j }}. So, E =
〈{P : P |= Ei or P |= E j }〉. Since Ei ∧ E j is inconsistent, there is some P ∈ E
such that P 	|= Ei . Hence {Ei , . . . , Ei , E j } 	|= Ei . 
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